CONSTITUTION OF THE LIVING DEAD

It’s Alive! The Persistence of the Constitution

I must admit to being a fan of the “living dead” movies and
the obvious sense that the Constitution has been amended sev1
their various progeny. Within the subgenre, the corpses of the
eral times since the founding. Practices that we would no longer
dead are reanimated through the influence of contagion, radiafind tolerable, such as slavery and the exclusion of women from
tion, or scientific intervention. These zombies then ravenously
the political process, and infirmities that we are not willing to
stalk the living, often creating a new generation of zombies in
accept, such as (arguably) the absence of a federal income tax
the process. Unlike the undead of the vampire mythos, the livor the lack of clarity in presidential succession, have been eliming dead are neither beautiful nor sophisticated. The living dead
inated over time in ways that are both explicit and perfectly conlumber through the landscape in an arrested state of decomposistent with the original constitutional design.
sition, falling apart and clearly dysfunctional and yet somehow
It is also true in a less obvious sense. Our constitutional sysstill ambulatory. Generally inarticulate and dimwitted, the livtem, as well as our constitutional text, looks very different than
ing dead are guided by irrational hunger and consume the livthe one imagined by the framers. For one thing, the constituing. Having risen from their graves, the living dead crowd the
tional machinery did not work as they expected. Influenced by
scene, attacking en masse, filling every possible escape route,
the republican political ideology of the time, for example, the
and blocking progress at every turn. In the movies, the dead hand
founders were highly skeptical of the value of political parties
of the past weighs very heavy indeed.
or factions, and they hoped that the political system that they
For some, the U.S. Constitution evokes similar nightmares. It
designed would discourage the growth of parties and limit their
shambles onward, completely out of its own context and barely
influence if they did arise.3 Instead, organized political factions
coherent, and yet refusing to die. It imposes itself on the living,
arose almost immediately. There was no consensus over the ends
mindlessly closing off options and privand means of the public good, and
ileging its own unnatural priorities.
organization proved an efficient mechChanging circumstances and
James Madison and his brethren loom
anism for making policy and staffing
changing aspirations have led
before us when they should be safely
the government. Similarly, the founders
political actors to alter the
behind us. Through the instrument of
thought population growth would occur
constitutional system in ways
the Constitution, the founders rule us
in the South rather than the North,
that are fundamental and yet
from beyond the grave.
enhancing the South’s influence in the
consistent with the terms of
Are we terrorized by a tyranny of the
House of Representatives and securing
the founder’s text.
dead? I do not believe that it is fruitful
political protection for its peculiar instiin either descriptive or normative terms
tution of slavery.4 Instead new citizens
to regard the written Constitution as a form of “temporal impeflowed into the free states of the North and Northwest. The South
rialism” that allows its authors to “dictate, even when their bodwas increasingly isolated politically and increasingly reliant on
2
ies are silent in death.” In this essay, I want first to ameliorate
countermajoritarian checks to protect its vital interests.
the problem of the Constitution of the living dead and then to
Democracy and slavery, and therefore union, proved to be conbriefly defend an approach to constitutional interpretation that
tradictory rather than mutually reinforcing. At the same time,
privileges original intent. Although the latter directs judges to
the interest in both preserving and eliminating slavery became
look to the language and intentions of persons long dead, it does
far more intense than the founders had imagined. Rather than
so out of respect for the living, not out of any special authority
being put on the path to gradual extinction, slavery became
of the dead.
even more difficult to dislodge in the decades after the foundIt should be emphasized that the Constitution is not quite the
ing. The constitutional design failed to prevent discord, rupture,
decrepit zombie that it is sometimes made out to be. We do not
and war. In the aftermath of the Civil War, the constitutional
live with the same Constitution that was handed down by the
system had to be redesigned and a key concern of the founders
founders in the late eighteenth century. Of course this is true in
was discarded.
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Other changes have been wrought within the confines of the
winning support from the people and expanding its own sphere
original framework but in ways that the founders never foresaw.
of influence.6
As John Marshall emphasized (perhaps overemphasized), the
The founders created a framework for government, and subConstitution was intended for a growing nation and has a fair
sequent generations have constructed a living body around it.
amount of flexibility to accommodate that growth.5 Changing
Although too much can be made of the biological metaphors
circumstances and changing aspirations have led political actors
favored by the Progressives, they were right to note that the
to alter the constitutional system in ways that are fundamental
Constitution is a living organism. Neither a Newtonian machine
and yet consistent with the terms of the founders’ text. The
nor an animated corpse, the constitutional system is a common
founders’ Constitution has been durable in part because it was
project constantly constructed and reconstructed by many hands
built on the back of the state constitutions. When the states
across the generations.7 The founders have not left us a dusty
underwent constitutional revolutions, the federal constitutional
mausoleum and insisted that we live within it. They have left us
text was relatively untouched, even though its operation was sigthe old family home, which we rewire, remodel, and redecorate
nificantly modified. Though exceptionally democratic in histo make habitable and comfortable for us.
torical terms, the constitutional system
The problem of an inherited constiof the founders was still dominated by
tution can only be ameliorated not elimThe founders created a framework
a social and political elite. Over time
inated, however. The Constitution is not
for
government,
and
subsequent
much more popular elements have been
an empty shell, essentially contentless
generations have constructed a
introduced into the system. Within
except for what we choose to add to it.
living body around it. Although too
decades of the founding, suffrage
The Constitution also imposes limits.
much
can
be
made
of
the
biological
restrictions had been drastically eased
We no longer particularly feel some of
metaphors favored by the Progressives,
and mass parties had been organized to
those limits, for we have outpaced them
they
were
right
to
note
that
the
mobilize popular participation in the
and have struggle with more salient
Constitution is a living organism.
government. Likewise, in the twentieth
limits of our own. Fortunately we have
Neither a Newtonian machine nor
century, popular participation in the
had no need to invoke the Third
an animated corpse, the constitutional
selection of political officials extended
Amendment’s ban on quartering troops
into the Senate and into the choice of
in private homes, and we no longer even
system is a common project constantly
party nominees. Eighteenth and nineconsider the types of punishments that
constructed and reconstructed by
teenth century battles over the power of
the founders might have thought cruel
many hands across the generations.
formal instruction of representatives by
and unusual. Even so, we still do feel
their constituents have been supplanted
the pinch of some of the framers’ handby the rise of the far more effective vehicle of public opinion
iwork. We sometimes would like to concentrate power that they
polling. The presidency grew from being a ceremonial figure
dispersed. We sometimes seek to restrict liberties that they
and constitutional magistrate to being a popular leader and an
thought should be protected. We have sometimes wanted to use
important policymaker. The nation has grown from being an isotheir text to trump our opponents whom we cannot overcome by
lated republic to a global superpower, with the attendant miliother means. Must we adhere to the language and intentions of
tary-industrial complex. We have accepted criminal and civil
those long dead when it interferes with our current political
procedures that the founders undoubtedly would have found
desires?
intolerable, while adopting others that they would have found
The answer to that question depends on what we mean by
utopian. Within a decade of living under the Constitution, the
“must.” There is nothing that prevents us from throwing off the
founding generation was already discovering that notion of free
chains of the past, just as members of the founding generation
speech in a democracy had a life of its own that rendered some
threw off the yoke of empire and abandoned the Articles of
traditional government practices politically unbrookable.
Confederation and some of their descendents broke the shackAlexander Hamilton argued that “the constitutional equilibrium
les of slavery. We could bid farewell to the founders’ text and
between the general and State governments” was “left to the prudraft a new one of our own, as the states have routinely done.
dence and firmness of the people” but asserted that “the natural
We could preserve the Constitution of 1789 as a revered politiconclusion of such contests will be most apt to end to the discal symbol and source of inspiration, but abandon it as a govadvantage of the Union.” But especially in the twentieth century
erning document and supreme law. Rather than seek to commune
Hamilton’s “conjectures” proved to be quite “fallible,” as the
with the spirits of the dead in order to resolve the bitter politinational government has proven more adept than the states in
cal disputes of the living, we could cease to interpret the
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Constitution and resolve our political differences on our own.
even keel until we are ready to revisit the issue.10 We should recWe could even constitute a great and Supreme Court armed with
ognize that the interpretive effort will require the exercise of
a “prerogative” power to right wrongs, fight injustice, and pracsome judgment, but we would, of course, expect the appointed
tice random acts of kindness, but no longer speaking in the name
interpreter not to exercise the discretion of a delegated deciof the law of the written Constitution.8 We could pursue our pressionmaker.
ent heart’s desires, and not worry about whether or not they are
The issue is what standard should be used to resolve conconstitutional.
temporary political controversies and who should have the authorIn the alternative, we could continue to adhere to the constiity to make the resolution. Contemporary political actors are
tutional and judicial project to which we have claimed fidelity
displaced by any judicial decision. If judges offer an interpretafor more than two hundred years and seek to live within the contion of the text in accord with the language and intent of the
fines of the Constitution as written. The implication of making
founders, then those contemporary political actors have only
that decision is that we must interpret the existing Constitution,
deferred their right to make the choice themselves and remake
which in turn necessitates adhering to the language and intenthe law. If judges do not offer such an interpretation, then we
tions of those long dead. In that case, the Constitution would not
have simply replaced one relatively democratic set of contemonly or merely be a source of inspiration or guidance or founporary decisionmakers with another much less democratic one.
dation for our own constitutional constructions, but would be an
If judges interpret the originalist text, then the people retain their
object of judicial and political interpresovereign lawmaking authority to cretation and a source of binding law.
ate, amend or replace the higher law. If
We privilege the intentions of the
I will not attempt to offer a full
judges do not, then the legislative power
founders
out
of
respect
for
the
role
9
defense of this claim here. Let me
of the sovereign people would have
of the constitutional founder, not out
instead simply sketch a reason why
been lost. The basic constitutional
of
respect
for
any
particular
founder.
adhering to the intentions of the dead is
choices would be made by judges rather
justified in terms of the living. As the
than by those who draft and ratify the
previous paragraphs indicate, the startconstitutional text, whether those
ing point for any such analysis is to recognize that the decision
drafters and ratifiers did their work two hundred years ago or
to interpret the written Constitution and be bound by the intenyesterday.
tions of the founders is a present one, made by living political
We privilege the intentions of the founders out of respect for
actors. It is not a decision that is or could be imposed on the
the role of the constitutional founder, not out of respect for any
present generation by the past. Unlike in a horror movie, James
particular founder. It is commonplace that we distinguish between
Madison cannot rise from his grave and force the hand of the
the office and the officeholder, between institutional and perliving. If we defer to Madison, it is our choice.
sonal authority. We respect the actions of the president and the
There are three ways to resolve current political disagreeCongress out of regard for the offices, not out of regard for the
ments. We can somehow work it out ourselves, through majorindividuals who hold those offices. Likewise, those who drafted
ity rule, bargaining and compromise, deliberation and debate,
and ratified our present Constitution occupied a political role. It
and the like. We can delegate the decision to somebody else. To
is a role that we do and should respect, not least because it is a
some degree we almost always delegate anyway, by electing and
role that we could ourselves play. It is true that we almost immehiring representatives to hash out the nation’s business in the
diately began to cloak the founders in a more personal authorcapital while we get on with the more important business of livity, developing a hagiography that emphasized their unique
ing our lives. But “we” could choose to delegate our controverwisdom and a narrative of special dispensation for the founding
sial political decisions to an even greater degree, throwing the
generation from the usual forces of interest and passion. 11
issue into the lap of a “blue-ribbon commission,” some execuAlthough sometimes useful, such political myth-making can
tive administrator, or even the courts. We divest political disalso be subversive of consensual constitutional governance and
cretion to some third party and live with the results. Finally, we
should certainly form no part of our current justification for
can abide by decisions that have already been made, that is we
adhering to the inherited Constitution. We should respect the
can adhere to the existing law. Rather than revisit the controsubstance of the constitutional choices of the founding not
versy ourselves or trust the discretion of someone else, we simbecause the founders necessarily got it right, but because we
ply defer to earlier judgments embodied in the law. Having made
should take seriously the idea of constitutional deliberation and
the decision to keep faith with the law, we may appoint somefounding as conscious, real-time political events. We should
one to interpret and apply the law for us and keep things on an
act so as to preserve the possibility of self-governance.
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It should be emphasized that the point of originalist constitutional interpretation is not to clear the way for current legislative majorities.12 Originalist judges are not necessarily
deferential judges. It may well be the case that the originalist
Constitution has little of substance to say about current political controversies. The Constitution may not require anything in
particular in regards to euthanasia, abortion, homosexuality, or
affirmative action.13 Deferring to the Constitution in such cases
may simply mean holding them open for future political resolution, and the constitutional interpreter should be sensitive to that
possibility. Nonetheless, it may also be the case that faithful constitutional interpretation requires turning aside the preferences
of current legislative majorities. The Constitution enshrines popular, not parliamentary, sovereignty.
All of this may seem to be begging a central question. Must
even a faithful constitutional interpreter be committed to the language and intent of the founders? The short answer is yes. The
implicit link between “language” and “intent” indicates the direction of the interpretive imperative. We readily recognize that we
cannot be said to be interpreting a text if we disregard its language. But the language in the text does not emerge from the
sea or drop from the sky, it was intentionally written by the
authors of the text in order to communicate a message, to convey their thoughts to others. The text only exists as an object of
interpretation if we assume that it embodies the intention of some
actual author employing language.14 At a minimum, the choice
of textual language reflects the intentions of an author that a
faithful interpreter is bound to respect. But language is a means,
not an end in itself. It should not be a fetish.15 We can only recognize the possibilities of malapropisms or irony if we are capable of distinguishing conventional language and authorial intent,
and of privileging the latter over the former.16 We use language
to convey intent. We interpret language in order to understand
intent. It is a difficult interpretive question to determine what
was actually intended by a particular piece of text, especially if
the text is complex and the author relatively unknown. Likewise,
it is a difficult interpretive question as to how best to go about
determining textual intentions. In some cases, the interpreter
may have nothing else available other than the text and an understanding of the usual conventions of the language. In other cases,
the interpreter may have a richer set of materials on which to
draw in the effort to understand what the author might have been
intending to say. Good interpretation requires skill and judgment,
but good interpretation is also oriented toward uncovering the
meaning that words were meant to convey from the author to the
reader.
A judge who strikes down a law as unconstitutional does so
not on his own personal authority but on the authority of the

Constitution. He speaks authoritatively not for himself, but for
the law—not as a constitutional actor, but as a constitutional
interpreter. The text of the Constitution, in turn, only has authority as a consequence of its popular providence. It is our
Constitution, because we have accepted it as our own. It lives,
because we have breathed life into it.
Keith E. Whittington is an assistant professor of politics and
John Maclean Jr. Presidential Preceptor at Princeton University.
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